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Abstract
In the present paper we address the relationship between the extent of business ownership (self-
employment) and economic development. We will focus upon three issues. First, how is the equilib-
rium rate of business ownership related to the stage of economic development? Second, what is the
speed of convergence towards the equilibrium rate when the rate of business ownership is out-of-
equilibrium? Third, to what extent does deviating from the equilibrium rate of business ownership
lead to less economic growth? Hypotheses concerning all three issues are formulated setting up a
new two-equation model. We find confirmation for the hypothesised effects using a data panel of 23
OECD countries. An important policy implication of our exercises is that low barriers to entry and
exit of self-employed/businesses are necessary conditions for the equilibrium seeking mechanisms
that are vital for a sound economic development.
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31 Introduction
In the present paper we address the relationship between the rate of business ownership (or self-
employment) and economic development. Central to our approach is the notion of an “equilibrium”
rate of self-employment. Equilibrium rates of self-employment can be derived by making assump-
tions about (1) the aggregate production function combining the efforts of business owners and
wage-employed individuals and (2) their rational occupational choice between self- and wage-
employment. Differences in the assumptions about the critical factors to choose self-employment
lead to different equilibrium models. Two early contributions are Lucas (1978) and Kihlstrom and
Laffont (1979). Lucas assumes individuals to have different managerial abilities while Kihlstrom and
Laffont assume individuals to differ with respect to their risk attitudes. Calvo and Wellisz (1980) ex-
tend Lucas' model by introducing a learning process through which managers acquire the necessary
knowledge. More recent contributions include Schmitz (1989), Holmes and Schmitz (1990), De Wit
and Van Winden (1991) and Gifford (1993). The equilibrium rate of business ownership depends
upon the stage of economic development. This may be due to changes in the aggregate production
function (e.g. scale economies) or the criteria of the occupational choice (e.g. degree of risk aver-
sion). Recently, Iyigun and Owen (1998) developed a model explicitly relating the equilibrium rate of
self-employment and the stage of economic development.
The variables self-employment and business ownership are used synonymously in the current re-
search. We use a data set covering 23 OECD countries for the period 1976-1996 where business
owners (self-employed) are defined as individuals owning a business that is not legally incorporated
or owning an incorporated business from which they gain profits as well as a salary.1 There are vari-
ous links between the rate of business ownership and economic performance.2 First, there is empiri-
cal and theoretical evidence of the existence of a long-term relation between the rate of business
ownership and the stage of economic development. Deviations from this "equilibrium" should be
interpreted as misallocation and may lead to adaptations in the number of business owners as well
as to lower growth levels. Second, low growth levels may lead to high unemployment levels making
self-employment more attractive providing an alternative at low opportunity costs. High unemploy-
ment levels may induce people who have a hard time finding work or whose careers are threatened
within existing companies to become self-employed. This is an example of economic growth affect-
ing the rate of business owners per labour force.
In short, we will focus upon three issues. First, how is the equilibrium rate of business ownership re-
lated to the stage of economic development? Second, what is the speed of convergence towards the
equilibrium rate when the rate of business ownership is out-of-equilibrium? Third, to what extent
does deviating from the equilibrium rate of business ownership lead to less economic performance
(growth)? All these hypotheses are used setting up a new two-equation model.
1
 For more details on these definitions, see Appendix I.
2
 See Brock and Evans (1986) for an early survey and Acs et al. (1999) for a more recent survey.
4Self-employment has received considerable attention from policy makers in European countries.
The persistently high unemployment rate coupled with limited economic growth in Europe has trig-
gered a plea by policy makers for rethinking the policy approach that ushered in European prosperity
during the post-war era. In two ways globalisation has reduced the ability of the European countries
to generate economic growth and create jobs. On the one hand, there is the advent of new compet i-
tion from low-cost countries in Central and Eastern Europe as well as Asia. On the other hand, the
telecommunications and computer revolutions have drastically reduced the cost of shifting not only
capital but also information out of the high-cost locations of Europe and into lower-cost locations
around the globe. Taken together, these twin forces of globalisation mean that economic activity in a
high-cost location is no longer compatible with routinized large-scale operations.
This is why both politicians and scientists have become interested in small businesses recently: la-
bour-intensive economic growth can be achieved by stimulating the small business sector because
generally small businesses are labour-intensive. Furthermore, entrepreneurship, in the form of new
firms, and intrapreneurship, in the form of new ideas and responsibilities implemented in existing
organisations, are essential to creating new economic activity. In modern economies a great variety
of organisations is involved in making innovative products. This is the case particularly in newly de-
veloped markets like in the ICT sector. The more organisations are active in such markets, the
greater the chance that an innovation takes place. Variety and selection play a dominant role in this
mechanism. It is deeply embedded in the current European policy approach that creativity, auton-
omy and independence embedded in self-employment contribute to higher levels of economic acti v-
ity. Therefore, major funds of governmental institutions and independent donor organisations are
being channelled towards young and small firms. The present paper provides evidence that the suc-
cess of such policies depends upon the phase of economic development.
The paper is set up as follows: in Section 2 a survey is given of the empirical and theoretical liter a-
ture on the relationship between business ownership and growth. Also some definitional and data
questions are covered. Our two-equation model is specified in Section 3 while Section 4 deals with
the data set of 23 OECD countries. In Section 5 the empirical results are discussed. Conclusions are
drawn in Section 6.
2 Theory
Our study focuses on the number of business owners (self-employed), although occasionally we will
refer to entrepreneurs despite the fact that these concepts are not synonymous. The two concepts
differ in two ways. First, business owners serve many roles and functions. Many researchers distin-
guish between Schumpeterian (or real) entrepreneurs and managerial business owners (Wennekers
and Thurik 1999).3 Entrepreneurs are a small fraction of the population of business owners. They
3
 In a similar fashion Audretsch and Thurik (1998) distinguish between two types of self-employed: the “shopkeeper” type and the
“Schumpeterian” type. In their analysis of how and why entrepreneurship has made important contributions to economic and
social life in modern industrialized countries they assume that these two types have different economic roles in their relation
5own and direct independent firms that are innovative and "creatively destroy" existing market struc-
tures. After realising their goals Schumpeterian entrepreneurs often develop into managerial busi-
ness owners, but some may again start new ventures or new firms. Managerial business owners are
to be found in the large majority of small firms. They include many franchisees, shopkeepers and
people in professional occupations. They belong to what Kirchhoff (1996) calls 'the economic core'.
Occasionally entrepreneurial ventures grow out of them. In an empirical context it is difficult to dis-
criminate between managerial business owners and entrepreneurs. For that one would need profiles
of individual business owners. Moreover, the discrimination is a theoretical one since most business
owners are neither pure "Schumpeterians" nor pure "shopkeepers" but share the attitudes associated
with these extremes in a varying degree. Second, entrepreneurial energy is not limited to self-
employed individuals. Large companies promote 'intrapreneurship' within business units to achieve
more flexibility and innovativeness (Stopford and Baden-Fuller 1994).
It is inconceivable however that a society where entrepreneurship by self-employment thrives would
not generate modern decentralised larger companies. In that sense the rate of self-employment may
be a fair indicator of a general level of entrepreneurship in a society, at least in modern economies.
Entrepreneurship remains a challenging concept (Amit et al. 1993) and of considerable importance
for a country's competitive edge (Porter 1990) and for the functioning and restructuring of markets.
That is why sometimes we will refer to entrepreneurship when discussing the determinants of
growth.
In this study we use data material of 23 OECD countries including the fifteen countries of the EU-15,
Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and U.S. for the period 1976
through 1996. We define the number of self-employed or business owners as including owner-
managers of legally incorporated businesses for the whole economy excluding the agricultural sec-
tor. See appendix I to this paper for more details.
The impact of economic progress on business ownership
The proportion of the labour force that is self-employed has decreased in most Western countries
until the mid-1970s. Since then the self-employment rate has started to rise again in several of these
economies. Blau (1987) observes that the proportions of both male and female self-employed in the
non-agricultural U.S. labour force declined during most of this century. He also observes that this
decline bottomed out in the early 1970s and started to rise until at least 1982. The data used in this
report show that the self-employment rate in the U.S. has continued to rise gradually since then.
More recently business ownership increased in several other countries like Australia, Canada, Spain,
the Netherlands and the U.K. In this section we present some empirical evidence and discuss the
main reasons for a structural or long-term relationship between the self-employment rate and eco-
nomic development.
                                                                                                                                                            
with unemployment. The number of “shopkeepers” is likely to go up if the level of unemployed rises and that same level is e x-
pected to go down if the number of “Schumpeterians” increases.
6An inverse relationship
A negative relationship between the self-employment rate and economic development was already
reported by Kuznets (1971) describing the shift in locus of production from family to firm. A negative
correlation of –0.85 between real per capita GDP and the self-employment share is found in Ya-
mada (1996). Schultz reports that “a 1% annual rate of growth in real income per adult is associated
with about the same increase in the share of wage earners for men and women, 0.15% and 0.16%,
respectively.” (Schultz 1990, p. 475). These studies use a large cross-section of countries with a
wide variety in the stage of economic development. Bregger (1996) reports a decline of the U.S.
self-employment for all industries from 18.5% in 1948 until 8.7% in 1975. The decline is less vehe-
ment when agriculture is excluded: from 12.0% in 1948 to 6.9% in 1975. This reduction in the rate of
self-employment is representative for that in many Western countries during the most part of this
century.
There are many reasons for the decline of self-employment, and of small business presence in gen-
eral. Lucas (1978) shows how rising real wages may raise the opportunity cost of self-employment
relative to the return. Given an underlying distribution of persons by “managerial” talent this induces
marginal entrepreneurs (in this context Lucas refers to managers) to become employees. This
pushes up the average size of firms. Chandler (1990) stresses the importance of investment in pro-
duction, distribution, and management needed to exploit economies of scale and scope during the
period after the second industrial revolution of the second half of the 19th century. It was a period of
relatively well-defined technological trajectories, of a stable demand and of seemingly clear advan-
tages of diversification. Audretsch and Thurik (1997) characterise this period as one where stability,
continuity and homogeneity were the cornerstones and label it the managed economy. Schaffner
(1993) takes a somewhat different and more theoretical approach. She points out that “over the
course of economic development the advantages firm owners derive from being less risk averse
(better diversified) than self-employed producers are likely to rise relative to the disadvantages
caused by the costliness of circumventing asymmetric information problems.” (p.435). Iyigun and
Owen (1998) develop a model implying that economic development is associated with a decline in
the number of entrepreneurs relative to the total number of employees. They argue that fewer indi-
viduals are willing to risk becoming an entrepreneur as the “safe” professional earnings rise with
economic development. See also Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979). Other explanations are from Gal-
braith (1956) who considered the increase in market concentration to be a consequence of ‘counter-
vailing power’ and Cohen and Klepper (1996) who see important scale advantages in R&D.
Reversal of the trend
Several authors provide evidence of the reversal of the trend towards less self-employment. Acs et
al. (1994) report that of 23 OECD-countries, 15 experienced an increase in the self-employment rate
during the 1970s and 1980s. They show that the weighted average of the self-employment rate in
OECD-countries rose slightly from 8.4% in 1978 to 8.9% in 1987. Closely related to the development
of the self-employment rate is the development of small business presence in general. Carlsson
(1989) provides data on the share of the Fortune 500 companies in total manufacturing. He shows
7that this share in total manufacturing employment dropped from 78.7% in 1975 to 72.5% in 1985. In
the same period the share of these firms in total shipments dropped from 83.2% to 77.2%. Other
sources showing that the growing importance of large business has come to a halt in Western cou n-
tries include Loveman and Sengenberger (1991), Acs and Audretsch (1993) and Acs et al. (1996).4
There are several reasons for the more prominent place of small business and self-employment in
Western economies. First, the last 25 years of the 20th century may be seen as a period of creative
destruction, as described in Schumpeter (1950). Piore and Sabel (1984) use the term Industrial Di-
vide, Jensen (1993) prefers the term Third Industrial Revolution, while Freeman and Perez (1988)
talk about the transition from the fourth to the fifth Kondratiev wave. Audretsch and Thurik (1997 and
1998) stress the effects of globalisation and the information revolution leading to the demise of the
comparative advantage of Europe in many of the traditional industries, such as machine tools, me t-
alworking, textiles and automobile production. The most obvious evidence is the emergence of new
industries like the software and biotechnology industries. Small firms play an important role in these
new industries. Acs and Audretsch (1987) provide empirical evidence that small firms have a rela-
tive innovative advantage over their larger counterparts in such highly innovative industries. Evi-
dence for the comparative advantage of small firms in inventing radically new products is also given
in Prusa and Schmitz (1991) and Rothwell (1983, 1984).
Second, new technologies have reduced the importance of scale economies in many sectors and
small technology-based firms started to challenge large companies that still had every confidence in
mass production techniques (Carlsson 1989). Meredith (1987) argues that small firms are just as
well, or better, equipped to implement technological advances and predicts the factory of the future
to be a small factory. Jensen argues that “It is far less valuable for people to be in the same geo-
graphical location to work together effectively, and this is encouraging smaller, more efficient, entr e-
preneurial organizing units that cooperate through technology” (Jensen 1993, p. 842). This is sup-
ported by Jovanovic saying that: “recent advances in information technology have made market-
based coordination cheaper relative to internal coordination and have partially caused the recent
decline in firm size and diversification” (Jovanovic 1993, p. 221). Others, like Rothwell (1983, 1984),
stress that large and small firms complement and succeed each other in the innovation and diffusion
process. His theory is one of ‘dynamic complementarity’. See also Nooteboom (1994).
Third, the increasing incomes and wealth have enabled individuals to consider ‘higher’ needs. As a
result the demand for variety increases (Jackson 1984). Cross-cultural influences have also en-
larged the demand for variety. Small firms are often the most obvious suppliers of new and special-
ised products. The decrease in diversification as reported by Jovanovic (1993) suggests that large
firms have not been capable of entering into such market niches.
Fourth, deregulation movements have swept the world. Phillips (1985) reports that small firms have
dominated in both the creation of new businesses and new jobs in deregulated industry sectors in
4
 See also the various editions of The European Observatory for SMEs  which provide an account of the state of small business in
Europe, for instance EIM (1997).
8the U.S. in the early 1980s. This confirms some preliminary empirical evidence as provided by
Shepherd (1982). Governments have also begun to acknowledge and promote the vital role by small
(start-up) firms in achieving economic growth and development. See Storey and Tether (1998) and
OECD (1998).
Fifth, there has been a tendency of large firms to concentrate on ‘core competences’ (Carlsson
1989). Jovanovic (1993) reports that the 1980s were characterised by corporate spin-offs and di-
vestment. Aiginger and Tichy (1991) blame much of the ‘back-to-basics’ and downsizing (or right-
sizing) tendencies on the opportunistic conglomerate merger wave of the late 1960s.5
Sixth, self-employment is more highly valued as an occupational choice than before. Roughly one
out of four young U.S. workers pursue self-employment according to Schiller and Crewson (1997).
Kirchhoff (1996) argues that self-employment is not anymore characterised as under-employment or
being mom-and-pop establishments, but as a way to achieve a variety of personal goals. Baumol
(1990) stressed the importance of entrepreneurship being led into productive channels. Also, as hy-
pothesised in social psychology there is a Maslowian hierarchy of human motivations, with physical
needs at the bottom and self-realisation at the top (Maslow 1970). A higher level of prosperity will
induce a higher need for self-realisation and thereby may stimulate entrepreneurship.
Finally, the employment share of the services sector has been well documented (Inman 1985) to
increase with per capita income.6 Given the relatively small average firm size and the low entry bar-
riers of most services (barring airlines, shipping and some business services) this creates more pos-
sibilities for self-employment.
Obviously, some of these factors may have had a temporary effect only. For example, it is not u n-
likely for the ‘back to core business’, outsourcing and deregulation waves to dry up.7 On the other
hand, there are more permanent effects like that of new technologies. We refer again to Freeman
and Perez (1988). They claim that in the new techno-economic paradigm (fifth Kondratiev wave) the
organisation of firms will be ‘networks’ of large and small firms. See also Oughton and Whittam
(1997) who emphasise the role of external economies of scale when explaining the viability of small
firms. Small firms will profit from the new model of flexible specialisation (Piore and Sabel 1984 and
Fiegenbaum and Karnani 1991). Moreover, the introduction of new technologies is also positively
related to the stage of economic development through necessary skills and other investments. Fi-
nally, the increasing variety of demand for specialised goods and services, the increased valuation
of self-realisation and the rise of the services sector are also dependent on per capita income.
5
 See also The Economist, Jan. 9th 1999, How to make mergers work (pp. 13-14) and How to merge: after the deal (pp. 19-21).
6
 Chenery (1960) provides an early analysis of the relation between sectoral structure and the stage of economic development.
7
 See The Economist, June 24th 1995, Big is back (survey).
9An equilibrium rate of business ownership
As the extent to which there is a reversal of the trend towards less self-employment is still not quite
clear we hypothesize a relationship between the rate of business ownership and per capita income
that is either L-shaped or U-shaped.8 In case of a L-shape it is assumed that the equilibrium busi-
ness ownership rate continues to decline with the stage of economic development while in case of a
U-shaped curve it is assumed that this trend is reversed at higher levels of development. The U-
shaped pattern has the direct implication that there is a level of economic development for which the
equilibrium business ownership rate is “minimal”.
The secular trend is best viewed as a long-term equilibrium rate of business ownership resulting
from technological conditions, the demand for goods and services and the supply of potential entr e-
preneurs. The theoretical viability of an equilibrium rate of self-employment is corroborated by De
Wit and Van Winden (1991) using an m-sector, n-group general equilibrium model of self-
employment. In this model several of the above determinants are used to determine the equilibrium
rate of self-employment. Schmitz (1989) derives the equilibrium fraction of the self-employed in an
endogenous growth model. Gifford (1992, 1993 and 1998) develops a model of entrepreneurial at-
tention between maintaining current activities and starting new ones. She derives the proportion of
agents choosing a career as innovative entrepreneur, managerial entrepreneur and salaried em-
ployee. See also Holmes and Schmitz (1990).
However, many forces may cause the actual number of self-employed (business owners) to differ
from the long-term equilibrium rate. Such a “disequilibium” (i.e. deviation from the long term equilib-
rium) may for example stem from cultural forces and institutional settings (regulation of entry, incen-
tive structures, functioning of the capital market). See Kirzner (1997), Davis and Henrekson (1999)
and Henrekson and Johansson (1999).
In a market economy there will be underlying endogenous movements to restore equilibrium. Some
examples may illustrate this point. A structurally low number of enterprises such as many Western
economies experienced in the late 1970s and early 1980s, has undoubtedly contributed to structural
unemployment. A positive influence of unemployment on self-employment has already been dem-
onstrated by several authors such as Storey (1991), Evans and Leighton (1989) and Audretsch and
Thurik (1998). Alba-Ramirez (1994) shows that for both Spain and the U.S. the duration of unem-
ployment increases the probability of becoming self-employed. His analysis suggests that the effect
of unemployment duration on the probability of becoming self-employed is not very different for the
two countries. The results are interesting especially since the Spanish economy has a higher degree
of unemployment and self-employment when compared to the American. The results suggest that
the influence of unemployment on business ownership is a common feature across economies.9
8
 Schultz (1990) reports having found statistical evidence for a quadratic relationship between the share of wage earners and the
stage of economic development.
9
 Alba-Ramirez (1994) also notes that legislation aimed to help the jobless start up their own business has been implemented
across developed countries and gives the example of the Spanish 1985 law providing lump-sum unemployment insurance to
workers willing to become self-employed.
10
Gradually high unemployment also results in wage moderation helping to restore profitability of pri-
vate enterprise. Finally, it is likely that a shortage of business ownership induces many policies fos-
tering entrepreneurship, ranging from a lower replacement ratio to better access to financing and
competition policies. See OECD (1998). These processes are hard to observe and may therefore be
modelled best using an error correction mechanism. Likewise a number of business owners which
structurally exceeds the equilibrium rate may be expected to diminish profitability, resulting in higher
exit (failure rates) and lower entry, and to induce policies and practices restricting entry.
The effect of business ownership on economic progress
There is some evidence on the relation between size class distributions and economic performance.
For instance, see Nickell (1996), Nickell et al. (1997), Gort and Sung (1999) and Lever and Nieu-
wenhuijsen (1999) who present evidence that competition, as measured by increased number of
competitors, has a positive effect on the rate of total factor productivity growth.10 Carree and Thurik
(1998, 1999) show that the share of small firms in manufacturing industries in European countries
has had a positive effect on the industry output growth. Thurik (1996) reports that the excess growth
of small firms11 has had a positive influence on percentage change in gross national product for a
sample of 16 European countries in the period 1988 through 1993. Audretsch and Thurik (2000)
show that self-employment has brought down unemployment for a sample of 23 OECD countries. 12
Schmitz (1989) derives from an endogenous growth model that an increase of the proportion of e n-
trepreneurs in the working force leads to an increase in long-run economic growth. See also Holmes
and Schmitz (1990) who develop a model of entrepreneurship in the spirit of T.W. Schultz. They
show how specialisation in managerial tasks and entrepreneurship – responding to opportunities for
creating new products and production processes – may affect economic development. Finally, some
evidence of a well-established historical (long-term) relationship between fluctuations in entrepre-
neurship and the rise and fall of nations has been assembled by Wennekers and Thurik (1999). In
this respect also the work of Eliasson (1995) on economic growth through competitive selection is of
relevance.
Another source of evidence on the relation between self-employment and progress is the economic
history of the formerly centralised planned economies. A characteristic of these economies was the
almost complete absence of small firms (and private ownership of the means of production), and
10
 Acs et al. (1999) point at differences in competition and entrepreneurship when comparing the more successful U.S. economy to
that of Europe and Japan.
11
 The excess growth of small firms is defined as the percentage change in the value-of-shipments accounted for by small firms
minus the percentage change in the value-of-shipments accounted for by large firms.
12
 A subset of small firms which are assumed to improve economic performance are the so-called New Technology-Based Firms
(NTBFs). Many of the businesses can be found on Science Parks of which the number in many countries has increased
strongly during the 1980s and 1990s. Storey and Tether (1998) show that most of the NTBFs are, in fact, small firms. They re-
port the average number of employees to be around 20 both in France and the U.K. The two countries were the first in Europe
(in 1969) to establish science parks (Cambridge Science Park in the U.K. and Sophia Antipolis in France). They claim that Italy
serves as an example of lagging behind in the establishment of 'advanced' science parks and relate this to the relatively low
proportion of university research that is financed by the Italian private sector.
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this extreme monopolisation constituted one of the major factors leading to the collapse of state s o-
cialism (Acs 1996). The development of small enterprises is considered a vital part of the current
transition process in Eastern Europe.13
In the current paper we assume that deviations between the actual and the equilibrium rate of busi-
ness ownership will diminish the growth potential of an economy in the short and medium term.14 A
shortage of business owners will diminish competition with detrimental effects for static efficiency
and competitiveness of the national economy. Worse still, it will also diminish variety, learning and
selection and thereby harm dynamic efficiency (innovation). On the other hand, a glut of self-
employment will cause the average scale of operations to remain below optimum. Moreover, it will
result in large numbers of marginal entrepreneurs, absorbing capital and human energy that could
have been allocated more productively elsewhere.
3 Model
Our main research object is to examine the interrelationship between business ownership and eco-
nomic development at the macro level. Therefore, we introduce a model that consists of two equa-
tions. The first equation deals with the causes of changes in the rate of business ownership whereas
the second deals with its consequences. From the first equation we derive the equilibrium rate of
business ownership as a function of the stage of economic development. In the second equation we
estimate the effect on economic growth of deviating from this equilibrium rate.
The first equation of the model relates the change in the rate of business ownership itE  in country i
in year t to the extent to which this rate deviated from the equilibrium rate *itE , to the unemployment
rate itU  and the labour income share itLIQ . It reads as follows:
(1) ( ) itt,it,it,i*t,it,iit LIQbUbEEbbEE 1434244104 ε+++−+=− −−−−−
The dependent variable is the change in the rate of business ownership over a four-year period. This
change is explained from the extent of disequilibrium four years before. In case the equilibrium rate
of business ownership lies higher than the actual rate, we expect a rise in the business ownership
13
 See for example Russia’s Shatalin Plan, which “is built on the assumption that society needs small enterprises to orient producti-
on to the needs of every person, to fight the dictatorship of monopolies in consumer and production markets, and to create a fa-
vourable environment for quick introduction of new scientific and technological ideas” (Nolan (1995), p. 82).
14
 Iyigun and Owen (1998) show in a dynamic model with two types of human capital (professional and entrepreneurial) that a mi-
sallocation of the existing human capital stock between professional and entrepreneurial activities may occur. The nature of the
inefficiency, however, is not clear-cut. There may be too much entrepreneurship or too little, depending on how entrepreneurial
and professional skills contribute to the level of technology. They find that “a more efficient ratio of professional and entrepre-
neurial skills will raise the steady state of technology, the wages paid to human capital providers, and therefore, the economy’s
human capital stock” (p. 457). Therefore, their model supports our notion that deviations from the level of optimal relative entre-
preneurial activity come at a cost of lower economic performance.
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rate. The hypothesis is that  0
1
>b . Next to this structural effect, we add an additional push and pull
factor. Self-employment may be an alternative to being unemployed. Therefore, we expect the rate
of unemployment to have a positive effect on the change in the business ownership rate. The hy-
pothesis is that  0
2
>b . The share of labour income in total income is an indicator of the return on
capital and profit rates. A high labour income share indicates that capital and entrepreneurship are
less highly rewarded in comparison to the labour factor than when this share is low. The variable is a
proxy for the earning differentials between expected profits of business owners and wage earnings.
We assume that a relatively high business profitability (as compared to wage earnings) acts as a pull
factor for business ownership. The labour income share is defined as the share of labour income
(including the "calculated" compensation of the self-employed for their labour contribution) in the net
national income. The expected sign of the parameter 
3
b  is negative.
We treat the unemployment rate and labour income share as factors independent of the extent of
disequilibrium. For example, if the actual business ownership rate is below the equilibrium rate but at
the same time the unemployment rate is low and the labour income share is high, we may find the
business ownership rate not to adjust towards equilibrium. In equation (1) a four-year period is cho-
sen for the lags as we do not expect the rate of business ownership to adjust within one or two years.
This reflects practical procedures and legal requirements involved in starting a new enterprise.
The second equation of the model relates the extent of economic growth ( )itYln∆  to the deviation
of the actual business ownership rate from the equilibrium rate. The variable itY  is defined as the
gross domestic product in purchasing power parities per U.S. dollar in 1990 prices in country i and
period t. We correct for business-cycle effects by including the extent of economic growth in the pe-
riod before and we correct for catching-up effects by including the level of economic development.
This level is measured by it)CAP/Y( , the per capita gross domestic product in purchasing power
parities per U.S. dollar in 1990 prices. The second equation reads as follows:
(2) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( )( ) it
t,i
t,it,it,i
*
t,it,iit CAP
Y
cYlnYlncEEgccYlnYln
2
4
384244104
ε+


+−+−+=−
−
−−−−−
In equation (2) the variable to be explained is economic growth in a four-year period, measured as
the relative change in gross domestic product (implemented as a log-difference). The first determi-
nant of growth is the deviation of the actual rate of business ownership from the equilibrium rate of
business ownership. As explained in a previous section, the deviation variable is expected to have a
negative impact on growth. We will consider two alternative penalty functions based on the squared
deviation ( 2x)x(g = ) and the absolute deviation ( x)x(g = ), respectively.
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Next to this deviation variable, lagged growth and the level of per capita income are taken into ac-
count as control variables. Using this last variable we capture the convergence hypothesis of coun-
tries: countries which are lagging behind in economic development can grow more easily than other
countries because they can profit from modern technologies developed in other countries. The ex-
pected sign of the parameter c3 is negative.
The equilibrium business owner rate is assumed to be a function of economic development as
measured by it)CAP/Y( . This is formally given in equation (3). We expect the function f to be
declining for low levels of economic development. For high levels of economic developments it may
start to increase again as argued in Section 2, but it may also keep declining further. We have ch o-
sen a parametric approach and have used four different equilibrium functions, two of which are U-
shaped and two of which are L-shaped. These are given in equations (3a) through (3d).
(3) 

 


=
it
*
it CAP
YfE
The equilibrium rate of business ownership equals α  when the GDP per capita is zero in each of the
four equations (3a) through (3d). In equation (3a) the relation between the level of development and
the equilibrium rate of business ownership is quadratic. We expect β  to be negative as initially
economic development is negatively correlated with the business ownership rate. This decline is
expected to become smaller over time, so γ  is expected to be positive. An important question is
whether the minimum of the U-shaped curve (when GDP per capita equals γβ 2/− ) is reached for
a level of economic development which some countries have already surpassed. A clear disadvan-
tage of equation (3a) is that when γ is indeed positive, the business ownership rate is bound to be-
come larger than unity at very high levels of development. However, we are not using the model to
predict the equilibrium business ownership rates into the future, but to explain causes and conse-
quences of the rate of business ownership for the levels of economic development observed within
our sample. Therefore, we only require that the equilibrium function remains between zero and one
for the values of GDP per capita observed. We call equation (3a) the ‘quadratic case’. Another U-
shaped relation can be found in equation (3b). Again we expect β  to be negative and γ  to be posi-
tive. An important difference between this ‘log-quadratic case’ and the quadratic case is that the rise
of the curve after the minimum has been reached is less steep than the decline before that mini-
mum.
(3a) 
2
itit
*
it CAP
Y
CAP
YE 


+


+= γβα Quadratic
14
(3b) 
itit
*
it CAP
Yln
CAP
YlnE 


++


++= 11 2γβα Log-Quadratic
Equation (3c) gives the first L-shaped equilibrium relation. The equilibrium rate is predicted to de-
cline from α  to βα −  as the level of economic development rises from zero to high levels. We call
this equilibrium relation the ‘inverse case’. The fourth case, given in equation (3d) is quite similar.
The shape of equations (3c) and (3d) may be somewhat different but the difference will be limited
given that both curves decline from α  to βα −  and decline relatively fast when the level of devel-
opment is low compared with more advanced stages of economic development. We call equation
(3d) the ‘log-inverse case’. We compare the four different equilibrium functions on the basis of the
explanatory powers in equations (1) and (2). That is, we compare the extent to which the change in
the rate of entrepreneurship and the economic growth rate can be explained from deviations of the
actual business ownership rate from the equilibrium business ownership rate.
(3c) 
1+





−=
it
it*
it
CAP
Y
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Y
E βα Inverse
(3d) 
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We use a two-step procedure to estimate the effect of being in disequilibrium on economic growth.
That is, we do not take into account the parameter restrictions (of the equilibrium function) across
both equations.15 Equation (3) is first incorporated into equation (1). This allows us to estimate the
parameters of the equilibrium function from the error correction process of the actual business ow n-
ership rate towards the equilibrium rate. The estimated equilibrium function is then incorporated into
equation (2).
When estimating equations (1) and (2), we weight the observations with the population size.16 We
think that large countries (in terms of for example population) such as the U.S. and Japan are more
important in establishing the relationship between business ownership and economic growth than
15
 One may also have equation (2) determine E* as a function of economic development. However, this would not provide us with an
equilibrium function but with an “optimal” business ownership rate function in the sense of maximizing economic growth. See
for example Schmitz (1989) how the “equilibrium” and “socially optimal” rates may differ. In the present analysis we are concer-
ned with the consequences of deviations from the “equilibrium“ rate.
16
 We have also used different weighting variables like the number of self-employed and the total real GDP in US dollars. Results
were barely affected by the choice of these different weighting variables.
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small countries. When the data of, for example, Luxembourg or Iceland would call for a different
relation, we would not want this to have a big impact on the model. A technical description of the
weighting of observations can be found in appendix II to this paper.
4 Data
We use data material of 23 OECD countries including the fifteen countries of the EU-15, Australia,
Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the U.S. Data have been used for
the years 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992 and 1996. The total number of observations, therefore, equals
115. The main data sources are the OECD Labor Force Statistics and the OECD National Accounts.
A detailed description of the variable definitions can be found in appendix I to this paper. In Table 1
the values are given of four variables in the middle year of our sample, 1988, for all countries.
From Table 1 we see that Greece, Italy and Spain have the highest levels of self-employment (bus i-
ness ownership) in 1988: more than 15% of the labour force. The unweighted sample average level
of self-employment in 1988 is 10%. The countries with the lowest levels of self-employment in 1988
are Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg and Sweden: seven percent or less of the
labour force. Looking at the GDP per capita in 1988, we see that the United States, Switzerland and
Luxembourg were the most affluent countries while Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain were the
least affluent countries in the sample. The unemployment rates in 1988 are highest in Ireland and
Spain: more than 15% of the labour force. Low unemployment rates are found in Japan, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, Iceland and Luxembourg: 3% or lower. The average unemployment rate in
1988 is 7%. High values of the labour income share are found in Denmark, Greece and Iceland. In
these countries business profitability is relatively low in comparison to average wage earnings of an
employee. Countries with a low labour income share in 1988 are the Netherlands, Portugal and New
Zealand: LIQ is below 0.775 (sample average in 1988 is 0.83). A country that attracts attention is
Greece with a labour income share in 1988 of 1.05. This has to do with the way the LIQ is calcu-
lated: self-employed persons obtain an imputed compensation for their labour contribution set equal
to the average wage earnings per employee. This is done in order to distinguish business profits
from labour compensation for self-employed persons. When the number of self-employed persons is
high, the calculation becomes less accurate since the imputed part of ‘wage earnings’ by the self-
employed is higher. Since Greece has the highest self-employment rate, this problem occurs for
Greece in particular. However, we can conclude that business profits are low in Greece: according to
the LIQ being in excess of one, the average self-employed person has a lower income than the av-
erage employee.
Table 1 shows that, in general, the countries with high self-employment rates have a relatively low
GDP per capita. An important exception, though, is Italy. Italy combines a high level of self-
employment with a normal (near average) level of per capita income. This is unusual: the countries
with many self-employed (business owners) are generally in a less advanced stage of economic de-
velopment (for example Greece and Spain). Roughly, Italy can be divided into two quite different
types of economies: a well-developed economy (Northern Italy) and a less developed economy
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(Southern Italy or the Mezzogiorno). Italy might not fit well in our model for this reason. A closer in-
spection of the data for Northern and Southern Italy17 shows that Northern Italy in particular deviates
from the expected pattern, i.e., the U-shaped or L-shaped trend of the relative number of business
owners set out against per capita income. The number of business owners in Northern Italy is higher
than one would expect on the basis of the advanced stage of economic development. Small and
medium-sized firms play a bigger role in (Northern) Italian manufacturing than in other industrialised
countries. A notable feature of the organisation of Italian small and medium-sized firm production is
its high geographical concentration in small areas or industrial districts (Piore and Sabel 1984). The
geographical distribution also shows that the majority of small and medium-sized manufacturing
firms is located in Northern and Central Italy (Acs en Audretsch 1993). It often has a strong family
component.
The specific Italian model of extensive small and medium-sized firm production when compared to
other countries in similar stages of development may have positive and/or negative effects on eco-
nomic growth. Many of the Italian firms are highly specialised and are organised on a flexible basis,
so as to meet specific customer needs, and produce well designed and fashionable goods, aimed at
the richest segments of the market. Another characteristic of the Italian model, however, is that Ita l-
ian R&D expenditures as a percentage of GNP are by far the lowest among the largest OECD-
countries. They amount to only half of that in Germany, the U.S. and Japan over a long period
(Klomp and Pronk 1998, p. 167). The data for Southern Italy seem to be in conformity with the gen-
eral pattern: there is a relatively high level of self-employment but combined with a relatively low
value of the GDP per capita.
Table   1 Values of the key variables in 1988
Country Self-employment1 GDP per capita2 Unemployment1 Labour income share
Austria 0.056 15651 0.053 0.817
Belgium 0.109 15326 0.097 0.802
Denmark 0.062 16263 0.087 0.909
Finland 0.071 15456 0.045 0.869
France 0.098 16421 0.100 0.811
Germany (West) 0.067 17245 0.062 0.805
Greece 0.186  7274 0.060 1.054
Ireland 0.111  9735 0.162 0.836
Italy 0.169 15289 0.110 0.806
Luxembourg 0.068 21103 0.016 0.837
The Netherlands 0.082 14867 0.091 0.773
Portugal 0.145  8424 0.057 0.718
17
 Separate data for North- and South-Italy are obtained from the Eurostat Regions Statistical Yearbook.
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Spain 0.156 10886 0.191 0.788
Sweden 0.064 16632 0.016 0.860
United Kingdom 0.100 15590 0.086 0.851
Iceland 0.101 17368 0.006 0.919
Norway 0.088 17301 0.032 0.828
Switzerland 0.082 20133 0.007 0.855
United States 0.116 21543 0.054 0.823
Japan 0.112 16328 0.025 0.854
Canada 0.079 18573 0.077 0.780
Australia 0.123 16154 0.072 0.786
New Zealand 0.136 13532 0.056 0.762
1
 Relative variable: per labour force
2
 Unity: purchasing power parities per U.S. $ at 1990 prices
A further illustration is given in Table 2 where the development of GDP per capita and the number of
business owners per labour force for the period 1976 through 1994 is reported for the major industri-
alised (G7) countries U.S., Japan, Canada, Germany (West part), U.K., France and Italy. Notice that
these countries weight heavily in the estimations such that deviations in the pattern of relative num-
ber of business owners versus GDP per capita for these countries will influence the parameter esti-
mates considerably.
Table 2  Per capita income and business ownership rate in G7 countries, 1976-1994
Country Y/CAP 19761 Y/CAP 19941 Self.Emp. 19762 Self.Emp. 19942
U.S. 17242 23123 0.088 0.116
Japan 11087 18655 0.117 0.092
Canada 14281 18453 0.065 0.087
Germany (West part) 13548 18999 0.067 0.076
U.K. 11704 16176 0.076 0.107
France 13174 17577 0.103 0.080
Italy 11245 16618 0.142 0.181
1
 Unity: purchasing power parities per U.S. $ at 1990 prices
2
 Relative variable: per labour force
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As can be seen from Table 2, the level of self-employment is much higher in Italy than in the other
G7 countries while the per capita income does not deviate considerably. For example, the U.K. has
a lower value of the GDP per capita in 1994. The higher level of self-employment in Italy can be
explained in part by specific Italian policy stimulating the small business sector. Our conclusion is
that the Italian economy has some specific characteristics that are not embedded in our basic
model. We will therefore incorporate a dummy for Italy in the first equation.18
5 Estimation results
Once we incorporate equation (3) into equation (1) we can estimate the parameters of the equation
and of the equilibrium function. As an example we will show it below for the ‘quadratic case’ of
equation (3a). Equation (1’) results when we incorporate the quadratic equilibrium function into
equation (1). This equation can be estimated using least squares. From the estimates we can derive
the estimates of the parameters of the equilibrium function. The way in which we estimate these pa-
rameters is given in equation (4). Using the covariance matrix of the least squares estimates of
equation (1’) the statistical program (TSP 4.2) derives the standard errors for these estimates of the
equilibrium function parameters.
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where U  and LIQ  stand for the (four year lagged) sample mean of the unemployment rate and
the labour income share, respectively. The sample consists of 115 observations: 23 countries times
5 years (1980 through 1996, once every four years, and 1976 through 1992 for the lags).19 Weight-
ing with the population size (in the year t-4) implies that all variables (including constants and dum-
mies) are multiplied with the square root of the total population. The OLS estimation procedure is
then applied to the transformed variables. In this way, larger countries are given a more pronounced
influence in determining the parameter estimates than smaller countries. The weighting procedure is
explained in detail in appendix II. The estimation results of equations (1) and (2) are given in Table
3.
18
 The incorporation of the dummy implies that an autonomous rise in the actual number of business owners has taken place in
Italy. This might be the case because of the specific government policies promoting startups. When such an autonomous rise in
self-employment takes place, it can have positive and negative effects on economic growth depending on whether or not the initial
number of business owners is higher or lower than the equilibrium rate. See Carree et al. (1999) for further discussion  of the incor-
poration of this dummy for Italy.
19
 Notice that for the Y variable (gross domestic product), which has a lag of eight years in equation (2), we also dispose of data for
the year 1972.
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In Table 3 the four different forms of the equilibrium function (3a) through (3d) are applied each with
both the absolute deviation penalty function and the quadratic penalty function. We will first discuss
the results for the first equation (1). For each of the four equilibrium forms we find the extent of dis-
equilibrium to significantly affect the change in the rate of business ownership (parameter b 1 is posi-
tive). That is, we find evidence of business ownership to adjust towards the level of equilibrium.
However, the speed of adjustment is low. Over a four-year period only about 9.4% (quadratic and
log-quadratic case) to 5.9% (log-inverse case) of the disequilibrium is adjusted for. In each of the
four cases we also find the unemployment rate to significantly affect the change in the rate of busi-
ness ownership. So, there is evidence for the existence of a push factor into self-employment. We
do not find a significant effect of the labour income share although the sign of the effect is consis-
tently negative across the four cases of the equilibrium function.
The log-quadratic case seems to perform best as a description of the equilibrium relation between
the level of development and the business ownership rate. The adjusted R-squared is 0.230, some-
what higher than the quadratic case and clearly higher than the inverse and log-inverse cases. The
level of GDP per capita at which the log-quadratic curve reaches its minimum is 16,343 U.S. dollars
of 1990 per capita. This is slightly less than the amount corresponding to the minimum for the quad-
ratic case (16,991 U.S. dollars). Notably, the hypothesised equilibrium rate of business ownership
indeed appears to exist. The estimates for the parameters α , β , and γ  differ significantly from
zero. Also, the estimated values of β  and γ  have the predicted signs although the estimated value
of α  lies above one.
Table 3: Estimation results for the four different equilibrium functions
Shape of equilibrium function and penalty function
Quadratic Log-Quadratic Inverse Log-Inverse
Parameter g(x)=x2 g(x)=|x| g(x)=x2 g(x)=|x| g(x)=x2 g(x)=|x| g(x)=x2 g(x)=|x|
b1  0.094  0.094  0.063  0.059
 (2.8)  (2.9)  (2.2)  (2.0)
b2  0.081  0.082  0.076  0.076
 (3.9)  (4.0)  (3.7)  (3.7)
b3 -0.009 -0.008 -0.012 -0.011
 (0.5)  (0.4)  (0.7)  (0.6)
α
 0.432  1.880  1.496  1.116
 (3.8)  (2.9)  (1.9)  (1.8)
β -0.0384 -1.244  1.456  1.335
 (2.8)  (2.6)  (1.7)  (1.6)
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γ
 0.00113  0.218
 (2.6)  (2.5)
2
adjR  0.222  0.230  0.211  0.205
LL -180.39 -179.80 -181.78 -182.12
c0  0.175  0.205  0.164  0.207  0.178  0.205  0.178  0.197
 (7.0)  (7.7)  (6.6)  (7.8)  (6.5)  (6.6)  (6.5)  (6.4)
c1 -6.647 -0.816 -3.397 -0.800 -4.564 -0.583 -4.619 -0.504
 (2.2)  (3.6)  (1.5)  (3.7)  (1.9)  (2.6)  (1.9)  (2.3)
c2 -0.161 -0.214 -0.141 -0.205 -0.167 -0.198 -0.170 -0.188
 (1.7)  (2.3)  (1.5)  (2.2)  (1.7)  (2.1)  (1.8)  (1.9)
c3 -0.0032 -0.0040 -0.0028 -0.0041 -0.0033 -0.0041 -0.0033 -0.0038
 (2.6)  (3.3)  (2.3)  (3.4)  (2.5)  (3.0)  (2.6)  (2.8)
2
adjR  0.703  0.720  0.698  0.721  0.699  0.707  0.700  0.703
LL -397.93 -394.08 -399.31 -393.74 -398.73 -397.07 -398.65 -397.82
Note: Each of the equations is weighted with population size. GDP per capita is measured in thousands U.S. dollars of 1990 per
capita. In the first equation for which the results are presented in the top of this table a dummy variable for Italy is incorporated.
Absolute t-values between brackets. The highest adjusted R-squared and log likelihood value (LL) are in bold.
Further investigation of the log-quadratic parabola shows that the minimum value is reached of
10.5% for the per capita income level of 16,343 U.S. dollars of 1990. For lower values of GDP per
capita (which corresponds to less developed economies), the equilibrium rate of business ownership
is considerably higher: for example 28.3% at 6,039 dollars (the lowest value of GDP per capita in
our sample for Greece in 1976). For the highest value of GDP per capita in our sample (23,444 dol-
lars for Luxembourg 1992), equilibrium business ownership is 13.1%. For the interpretation of this
parabola describing the equilibrium rate of business ownership given a certain stage of economic
development, it should be noted that the relation is based upon a limited range of values of GDP per
capita. For values of per capita income far outside our sample range, the equilibrium rate of busi-
ness ownership is not properly described by the (log-)quadratic function. This implies that the rela-
tion cannot be used for very long term predictions of the rate of business ownership, since the rate
would go beyond one eventually.
The hypothesised error-correction process of the number of business owners towards the equilibrium
rate is supported for the ‘log-quadratic case’: parameter b1 is significantly positive. The speed of ad-
justment is not high: the deviation from equilibrium at a certain point in time is predicted to decrease
with 9 percent in the subsequent period of four years. This corresponds to a 50 percent decrease in
a period of 28 years, ceteris paribus. The low value of the speed of adjustment is not surprising: the
process of the relative number of business owners converging to the equilibrium number is intrins i-
21
cally slow because it involves both changes in policies and structural changes of the supply side
(setting up enterprises, investments in physical and human capital, divestments, etc.). We note that
error-correction should not only be searched for in a change of the actual self-employment rate, but
also in a change of the equilibrium rate over time.
The parameter b2 points to a positive impact of unemployment on self-employment: every percent
point rise in the unemployment rate leads to a rise of 0.082 percent point in the self-employment
rate in the succeeding four years. This is in accordance with earlier studies: unemployment is a push
factor for self-employment (Evans and Leighton 1989 and Storey 1991). The other variable explain-
ing the change in self-employment, the labour income share does not show a significant relation with
the change in the self-employment rate.
For the growth equation (2) the following results are found. The absolute deviation penalty function
in the ‘log-quadratic case’ is found to have the highest adjusted R-squared. We will focus our atten-
tion to this case. An important characteristic of the estimation results is the deviation of the actual
number of business owners from the equilibrium rate having a negative impact on economic growth:
the parameter c1 is significantly negative. This implies that economies with relatively too many or
too few business owners can grow by stimulating scale or by stimulating business ownership (viz.
entrepreneurship), respectively. Lagged growth has a negative estimated effect of -0.205, repre-
senting cyclical fluctuations: a period of high economic growth is followed by a period with lower
growth and vice versa. The per capita income parameter c3 is estimated to be negative. This might
reflect the convergence of countries hypothesis.
Some additional remarks on the deviations E-E* are the following. We find a considerable increase
in the value of E-E* for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain in the period 1976 through 1992. These
countries were integrated into the European Union during that period and benefited from develop-
ment programs promoting small and young firms. In total 15 out of 23 countries showed a conver-
gence in the business ownership rate towards the equilibrium rate over the 1976-1992 period in the
sense that the absolute difference between the actual and equilibrium rate was higher in 1976 than
16 years later. In 1992 there were seven out of 23 countries which had too many self-employed rela-
tive to the stage of economic development. The three countries with the highest positive deviation
from the equilibrium are Italy, Spain and New Zealand. In New Zealand this may be a result of the
economic reforms in this country, through which business ownership experienced a big boost in the
early eighties. See Evans et al. (1996). The positive deviation is highest for Italy (+0.071). This ind i-
cates that the high level of self-employment in Italy is not efficient: it has a relatively large negative
impact on economic growth.20
Table   4 Impact on economic growth of quadratic and absolute deviation specifications1
20
 In Italy, research and development expenditures are by far the lowest among the largest OECD countries as a percentage of
gross national product. This is in line with the idea that when there are too many business owners, the scale advantages in re-
search and development are not utilized. See Cohen and Klepper (1996).
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Difference Quadratic Linear Ratio
c0 = -3.397 c0 = -0.800
 1  0.034  0.800 23.5
 2  0.136  1.600 11.8
 5  0.849  4.000  4.7
10  3.397  8.000  2.4
20 13.588 16.000  1.2
23.55 18.840 18.840  1.0
1
 Unity: percent points (except last column). The last column shows the ratio of
the values for the linear and quadratic case.
Analysing whether the different specifications imply different impacts of deviations from the equilib-
rium rate we see that in equation (2) for the ‘log-quadratic case’ with the quadratic impact c0 = -
3.397. In case of the linear (absolute deviation) impact we have that c 0 = -0.800. We can calculate
the impact on economic growth of a deviation of one percent point from equilibrium. For 2x]x[g =
the negative impact is 3.397 * 0.012 = .00034 (.034 percent point), whereas for x]x[g =  the im-
pact is .800 * .01 = .0080 (.80 percent point). Hence, for a 1% deviation the impact on cumulative
growth in the subsequent four years is 23.5 times greater for the linear impact specification than for
the quadratic impact specification. Of course, this difference becomes smaller when the deviation
increases. See Table 4.
From Table 4, we see that the impact of a deviation of the actual number of business owners from
the equilibrium rate is generally greater for the linear type of impact than for the quadratic type of
impact. Only when the deviation is in excess of 23.55 percent points, the impact of the quadratic
penalty function becomes larger. However, an (absolute) deviation of 23.55 percent point is outside
the range of values that we find for the deviation from equilibrium. In general we can say that the
negative impact on growth of a deviation is quite large for the linear impact model (0.8 percent point
over a four year period for every percent point deviation). Furthermore, we see from Table 3 that the
adjusted R-squared is higher for the absolute deviation penalty function than for the quadratic pen-
alty function: 0.721 versus 0.698. This is an indication that the linear impact model is a more appro-
priate specification than the quadratic impact model.
The results for equation (1) as reported in Table 3 suggest that the equilibrium function is U-shaped
in stead of L-shaped. That is, the adjusted R-squared of the quadratic and log-quadratic curves are
higher than those for the inverse and log-inverse curves. One way to test for whether the U-shaped
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curve performs better than the L-shaped curve is to use a likelihood ratio test procedure. We incor-
porate both the quadratic elements of equation (3a) and the inverse element of equation (3c) in one
equation and test the null hypothesis of the inverse element to have no additional contribution next
to the two quadratic elements. The likelihood ratio test statistic is 1.06 which is insignificant at the
usual significance levels (1 degree of freedom). We also test the null hypothesis of the two quadratic
elements to have no additional contribution next to the inverse element. The likelihood ratio test sta-
tistic is 3.85 which is again insignificant (2 degrees of freedom). So, using this procedure we cannot
discriminate between the quadratic and inverse case. We did the same for equations (3b) and (3d).
The first likelihood ratio test statistic then equals 0.12 which is insignificant (1 degree of freedom).
The second likelihood ratio test statistic is 4.76 which is significant at the 10% level (2 degrees of
freedom). So, there is some evidence that the equilibrium function (3b) which performs best in terms
of adjusted R-squared significantly outperforms the equilibrium function (3d) which performs worst in
terms of adjusted R-squared. However, we should take care in our conclusion that the U-shape per-
forms better than the L-shape in general on the basis of likelihood ratio testing.
Figure 1a: Business ownership versus per capita income for G7-countries, 1976-1992
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Figure 1b: Business ownership versus per capita income for G7-countries, 1976-1992, with equilibrium functions
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We illustrate both a quadratic equilibrium function and a declining equilibrium function in the figures
1a and 1b. In these figures business ownership is set out against per capita income for the major
industrialised countries (G7) for the sample period 1976 through 1992. In figure 1b, we have also
plotted two estimated equilibrium functions: the “log-quadratic case” and the “log-inverse case”. The
other lines in figure 1b are the same as in figure 1a. For ease of presentation, we have not inserted
the names of the countries in figure 1b. Notice that business ownership is again a relative variable
(per labour force) and that the horizontal axis starts at 8,000 U.S. dollars of 1990 per capita.
We see that, of the G7 countries, only Japan and France show a descending pattern of the relative
number of business owners as the GDP per capita rises. In the other countries the number of busi-
ness owners rises or stays constant when countries reach a higher stage of economic development.
From figure 1b we find that there are more G7-countries below the equilibrium curve than above.
This may indicate that these countries lag in their economic performance due to too little entrepre-
neurial ventures or due to their slow pace of transformation from, for example, large scale based
medium-tech industries to high-tech industries. We note that the development of the business own-
ership rate for the largest economy, the U.S. is traced best by the log-quadratic curve. The deviation
of the actual rate for the U.S. from the equilibrium rate is relatively small. However, this was to be
expected because the U.S. economy has the largest weight in the weighted regression procedure.
6 Conclusions
There are many links between entrepreneurship and the macroeconomy. The present paper zooms
in on one specific linkage: that between the number of business owners and economic development.
Three aspects of this linkage are investigated. First, whether there is a long-term equilibrium relation
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between the number of business owners and the stage of economic development. The relation is
hypothesised to be a decreasing function of economic development in that the self-employment rate
is high in low-developed economies whereas there is a later phase where mass production and scale
economies thrive. A large literature points at a still later phase of economic development where the
business ownership rate is increasing again. This phase is characterised by "the reversal of the
trend" towards increasing economies of scale and scope. However, it is still unclear to which extent
this reversal will be structural. Therefore both a U-shaped as well as an L-shaped equilibrium rela-
tion are tested in the present paper. Second, whether there exists a correction mechanism when the
rate of business ownership is out of equilibrium and how fast this adjustment proceeds. Out of equi-
librium situations can occur due to exogenous shocks and institutional divergences, for instance,
because “government regulation of market activity is likely to obstruct and frustrate the spontane-
ous, corrective forces of entrepreneurial adjustments” (Kirzner 1997, p. 81). Third, whether deviating
from the equilibrium rate of business ownership leads to lower economic growth. The three aspects
are tested using a two-equation model. The first equation explains the growth of the number of busi-
ness owners using the deviation of the actual rate of business ownership from the equilibrium rate,
unemployment as a push factor and labour income share as a measure of business profitability. The
second equation explains economic growth from the deviation of the actual rate of business owne r-
ship from the equilibrium rate, lagged economic growth and the per capita income level. The model
is tested using a data panel of 23 OECD countries. Attention is paid to the specific role of Italy's twin
economy, the penalty structure of an economy in "disequilibrium" and the shape of the long-term
equilibrium relation between the number of business owners and the stage of economic develop-
ment.
Our investigations show that both the U-shaped and the L-shaped relation between the number of
business owners and the stage of economic development produce satisfactory results and that a
statistical discrimination cannot be made since "the reversal of the trend" is of a recent date only.
However, the minimum of the U-shaped equilibrium relation is within the range observations of ec o-
nomic development. This minimum is calculated to be a business ownership rate of approximately
10.5 % of the labour force at a per capita income of 16,300 U.S. dollars at 1990 prices. Therefore,
the assumption of a U-shaped curve would imply that modern economies are now in a phase where
the rate of business ownership is likely to increase structurally. The rate of business ownership is
shown to influence economic growth through deviations from the equilibrium rate. This result sup-
ports the view that size distribution differences across countries matter when explaining economic
performance (Davis and Henrekson 1999). As a consequence, economies can have too few or too
many business owners and both situations lead to lower growth rates. By and large, a five percent
point deviation generates a growth loss of between one and four percent (depending upon the par-
ticular specification of the penalty function) over a period of four years. In particular, the fact that
economic development may be hampered by a number of business owners being too high consid-
ering an economy's stage of development may come as a surprise for European politicians who see
self-employment as a forceful weapon when fighting unemployment and stagnating growth. Different
economic stages call for different development and stimulation programs. Italy may serve as an im-
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portant example in that the country has had a strong increase of the already high rate of self-
employment compared to countries in similar stages of economic development. This increase is
predicted to have frustrated economic growth.
Most countries show a convergence towards the equilibrium rate of business ownership in the period
1976 through 1992. Our model allows for two mechanisms for a disequilibrium between the actual
and the equilibrium rate of business ownership to diminish. The first explicit mechanism is that of the
actual rate of business ownership to converge to the equilibrium one given the level of economic
development. The second implicit one is that of economic development causing the equilibrium
level to shift towards its actual rate. The speed of the first explicit error correction mechanism
amounts to a half time of almost three decades. An important policy implication of our exercises is
that not only that "To induce dynamic entrepreneurial competition we require the fulfilment of only
one condition: guaranteeing free entrepreneurial entry into any market where profit opportunities
may be perceived to exist" (Kirzner 1997, p.74) but also that exit free of stigma and financial bur-
dens is safeguarded. See also Acs et al. (1999). Low barriers to entry and exit of entrepreneurs are
necessary conditions for the equilibrium seeking mechanisms which are vital in our model of the
relation between business ownership and economic growth.
Future research should investigate whether different countries have different equilibrium relations
depending upon institutional, industrial and other dimensions and how and to what extent policy
measures (are able to) influence this equilibrium. Furthermore, while the present research is fully
based upon country-wide composites, sectoral diversity between countries probably plays a role
when explaining differences in the equilibrium level of business ownership and differences in the
equilibrium restoring mechanism. Having a too low business ownership rate may, for example, ind i-
cate that the transition from manufacturing towards services is lagging behind when compared to
other countries. This is a different kind of misallocation than having too few entrepreneurship within
the sectors themselves. However, for a sectoral based research initiative many data problems have
to be resolved.
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Appendix I: Data
The following countries are in the estimation sample (1976-1996):
Austria Greece Spain U.S.
Belgium Ireland Sweden Japan
Denmark Italy U.K. Canada
Finland Luxembourg Iceland Australia
France Netherlands Norway New Zealand
Germany (West) Portugal Switzerland
The variable definitions and main sources are listed below.
1. E: self-employment or business ownership. This variable is defined as the number of self-
employed (business owners) per labor force, who in this report are defined to include owners of
enterprises that are not legally incorporated as well as owner/managers of incorporated busi-
nesses. We use the terms self-employed and business owners interchangeably. For more infor-
mation on various measures of self-employment, see The State of Small Business; A report of
the president 1986, Washington: US Government Printing Office, chapter 4. 
Data on the number of self-employed (business owners) are from the OECD Labor Force Statis-
tics 1974-1994 and OECD Labor Force Statistics 1976-1996. Some data were missing however.
EIM completed the data by using ratios derived from other variables, which sometimes came
from other sources. Furthermore, EIM made a unified data set of self-employed persons, which
was necessary as in the OECD statistics the definitions of self-employed were not fully compati-
ble between countries. In some countries self-employed are strictly defined as individuals owning
a business that is not legally incorporated. In other countries, owner/managers of an incorporated
business who gain profits as well as a salary, are also considered self-employed. Australia, Can-
ada, Denmark, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain and U.S.
use the narrow definition, while the other countries apply the broader characterisation. For the
countries not following the broader definition, EIM made an estimation of the number of
owner/managers by using information derived from statistical bureaus in these countries. Another
difference in definition is that in some countries unpaid family workers are included in the data of
self-employed as well. The unpaid family workers were eliminated from the data by using ratios
derived from other variables or by using other domestic sources. Data on the labor force are also
from the OECD Labor Force Statistics 1974-1994 and OECD Labor Force Statistics 1976-1996.
Again, some missing data have been filled up from other sources.
2. Y/CAP : gross domestic product per capita. The underlying variables gross domestic product
and total population are from OECD, National Accounts 1960-1996, Detailed Tables, and from
the OECD Labor Force Statistics 1974-1994, respectively. The GDP is measured in constant
prices of 1990. Furthermore, purchasing power parities per US dollar in 1990 prices are used to
make the monetary units comparable between countries.
3. U : (standardised) unemployment rate. This variable measures the number of unemployed as
a fraction of the total labor force. The labor force is formed by employees, self-employed per-
sons, unpaid family workers, people who work in the army and unemployed persons. The main
source for this variable is OECD Main Economic Indicators. Some missing data on the number of
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unemployed have been filled up with help of data from the OECD Labor Force Statistics and the
Yearbook of Labor Statistics from the International Labor Office.
4. LIQ : labor income share. The following definition is used. Total compensation of employees is
multiplied by (total employment/number of employees) to correct for the imputed wage income
for the self-employed persons. Next, the number obtained is divided by total income (compensa-
tion of employees plus other income). The data on the separate variables are from the OECD,
National Accounts 1960-1996, Detailed Tables. Some missing data have been filled up with help
of data from the OECD Labor Force Statistics.
5. Y: gross domestic product. This is the same variable as the Y part of the variable Y/CAP (see 2.).
Appendix II: Weighted regressions
Estimation results are obtained by weighting the observations with the number of self-employed. In
this appendix the reasons for doing so will be explained. For simplicity we will assume that we have
cross-section data (i.e., without time-dimension).
Suppose that there are N regions in L countries with L << N. In our case, L would be 23 because we
have 23 countries in our data set. We assume that these N regions are all of the same size. Thus,
for example, the U.S. would have many more regions than Luxembourg. If we would dispose of data
per region, we would propose the following model for a linear relationship between two variables x
and y:
(a)  y xR i R i R i, , ,= +β ε , i = 1,…,N (regions).
The subscript R is used to denote that the data are assumed to be available at the regions-level.
The OLS-estimator of β in (a) is then
b a
x y
x x
OLS
R i R i
i
N
R i R i
i
N( )
, ,
, ,
=
=
=
∑
∑
1
1
.
However, we have data at the aggregation level of countries and not at the level of regions. Given
our assumption that the regions are equally large, we can write the model with the variables x and y
at the country level (subscript C) as
(b)  y xC j C j C j, , ,= +β ε , j = 1,…,L (countries), with
y y NC j R i j
Di j
, ,
/
,
=
=
∑
1
 and x x NC j R i j
Di j
, ,
/
,
=
=
∑
1
,
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and where we define the variable Di,j as follows: Di,j = 1 if region i lies in country j and 0 otherwise.
Furthermore, Nj denotes the number of regions in country j ( N Nj
j
L
=
∑ =
1
). Hence, we assume that
the variables x and y at the country-level can be written as the averages of the variables over the
regions of the country. When we translate these country-level variables yC,j and xC,j from (b) back to
the regions-level variables yR,i and xR,i from (a), we obtain the following observations for our original
model (a) at the regions-level:
Observations for which:
Di,1 = 1:
11 ,C
*
i,R,C
*
i,R xxyy == (N1 observations)
.
.
Di,L = 1: L,C
*
i,RL,C
*
i,R xxyy == (NL observations)
Writing the data at the regions-level in this manner, it is implicitly assumed that within countries, the
various regions are identical. With these observations, the OLS-estimator can be written as:
∑
∑
∑
∑
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=
=
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Thus, here it is assumed that there are N observations where for every observation (region) within a
country, the variables have identical values. However, we have only L observations and then the
OLS-estimator of β from (b) reads as
b b
x y
x x
OLS
C j C j
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j
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.
We see that this estimator is different from b*OLS (a), which we would like to have. The estimator
bOLS (b) does not take account that different countries have different numbers of regions, or stated
differently, that the various countries are not equally large. Therefore, we weight the observations by
premultiplying the variables xC and yC from (b) with the square root of the number of regions. When
we do that the (weighted) least squares estimator bWLS (b) reads as
b b
N x N y
N x N x
WLS
j C j j C j
j
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j C j j C j
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.
We see that the WLS-estimator of (b) is exactly the same as the OLS-estimator of (a), b*OLS (a).
Clearly, we do not know the number of regions per country. We use the population size as a proxy.
